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Rejoinder to the Comments of Professors Coffee, 
Macey, and Simon 
Steven L. Schwarcz • 
I am truly honored that three of the leading luminaries of corporate law, 
ethics, and legal opinions have read, let alone commented on, my Article. 
Some of their comments suggest certain differences of perspective and 
approach. This rejoinder attempts to show how similar, nevertheless, our 
views really are. 
I. Rejoinder to Professor Coffee 
In his persuasive and elegant response, Professor Coffee "agree [ s] with 
much that [I] say[] about the insufficiency of a negative externalities standard" 
but states that he "part[ s] company essentially over whether the attorney 
delivering a third-party opinion has any affirmative obligation to inquire into 
the transaction's legitimacy."l Even "if no warning signals are evident," he 
argues, legal ethics should mandate a "minimal inquiry ... into the legitimacy 
of the specific transaction.,,2 By this, he means that the attorney should at least 
"ascertain that the transaction has a legitimate business purpose.,,3 
Less separates our respective positions, however, than Professor Coffee 
suggests. My Article argues that opining counsel should examine (at 
minimum) the portion of transactions on which they opine to ascertain 
lawfulness4 and that if, in the course of that examination, they spot warning 
signs, they should investigate further before issuing their opinions. One of my 
central examples of a "warning sign" is the failure to see a valid business 
purpose.6 Thus, Professor Coffee and I are saying essentially the same thing: 
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\. John C. Coffee, Jr., Can Lawyers Wear Blinders?: Gatekeepers and Third Party Opinions, 
84 TEXAS L. REv. 60, 60 (2005). 
2. Id at 71. 
3. Id at 72. 
4. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 
TEXAS L. REv. 1,34 (2005). 
5. /d. 
6. Id at 35 (defining a "warning sign" as "failure to see a business purpose in [the] 
transaction," and referencing Professor Shaun Martin's observation that "if a lawyer can't come up 
with a good business reason for what she is doing, the lesson [of Enron] is to think twice about it"). 
94 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:93 
counsel should at least have a duty to ascertain that transactions on which 
they opine have a valid business purpose. 
Professor Coffee and I nonetheless appear to emphasize different factors 
in finding this duty. Coffee focuses on protecting public investors who re-
ceive third-party legal opinions.7 Indeed, a cornerstone of his argument is 
that "where public investors are the recipients [of legal opinions], legal ethics 
should seek to protect the opinion-recipient from being reasonably misled 
(even by a technically accurate opinion)."g That argument, however, 
conflates the investors who are recipients of the legal opinions with the 
injured public investors. The former are investors in the SPV's securities, 
the latter investors in the originator's securities.9 I therefore respectfully dis-
agree with the specific line of reasoning used by Professor Coffee to impose 
a duty on counsel to ascertain that transactions on which they opine have a 
valid business purpose (although I find this same duty through a separate line 
of reasoning). 10 
I do not disagree, however, with Professor Coffee's suggestion that the 
attorney ascertaining the transaction's business purpose "should be under an 
obligation to take reasonable affirmative steps to integrate all the knowledge 
possessed by the attorney's law firm.,,11 His rationale is that the law firm, 
not the individual attorney, renders the opinion. My Article does not address 
these details, but if it did I would agree with this insight. 
It is somewhat unclear whether Professor Coffee and I differ in any 
substantive conclusions. I argue, for example, that the duty of opining 
counsel should extend beyond ascertaining that transactions on which they 
opine have a valid business purpose: 
[If] in the course of preparing due diligence for their opinion, such 
counsel ... spot [any] warning signs putting them on notice of 
problems ... they should investigate further before issuing their 
.. 12 
opmlOn. 
Coffee proposes that "the attorney [should] halt in the face of red flags 
[i.e., warning signs].,,13 He therefore is silent on whether the attorney should 
go further, as I suggest, to investigate whether the warning signs can be 
resolved. If he were to focus on it, I believe he would agree with my 
suggestion. 
See also id. at 52 (observing, when applying my Article's framework, that "so long as counsel sees 
a business purpose, counsel should be able to proceed"). 
7. Coffee, supra note I, at 68,73-74. 
8. [d. at 73-74. See also id. at 60 ("This brief comment focuses not on the normal relationship 
between attorney and client, but on the very different relationship between an attorney who is 
retained by a client to give an opinion to third parties who will foreseeably rely upon it."). 
9. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 22-23. 
10. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
11. Coffee, supra note 1, at 72. 
12. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 34 (citations omitted). 
13. Coffee, supra note 1, at 72. 
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Professor Coffee also contends that coupling this duty (to halt in the 
face of warning signs) with a duty to ascertain that the transaction has a 
legitimate business purpose would "spare[] everyone the costs of an ex post 
determination as to whether the attorney culpably missed or ignored warning 
signals.,,14 Such costs would only be spared, however, where the existence 
of a legitimate business purpose obviates counsel's need to heed other 
possible warning signs. It is therefore uncertain if Professor Coffee is 
arguing (as I do) that opining counsel should be alert for warning signs even 
after identifying a valid business purpose.1 5 
The duty of opining counsel to be alert to warning signs may well 
generate costs (including, as Professor Coffee observes, the costs of ex post 
determinations). Having practiced law for many years and thus being sensi-
tive to the need to have ex ante clarity, I am sympathetic to Professor 
Coffee's concern. For this reason, my Article advises that "[c]ourts 
should ... exercise caution against finding warning signs where none 
exist.,,16 There will, nonetheless, be residual costs; but such costs appear 
justified for reasons of professionalism and pragmatism. For the sake of the 
profession (and one's own integrity), a lawyer cannot simply ignore some-
thing that he or she sees, or should see, as a warning sign of a problem. 
Pragmatically, nothing that Professor Coffee or I say will prevent legal 
opinions from being judged with hindsight bias if warning signs are missed. '7 
It is better that opining lawyers recognize this reality and act accordingly. 
Another possible difference in our substantive conclusions is that 
Professor Coffee suggests that an attorney giving a "true sale opinion, 
knowing that the auditor will rely on this opinion in permitting the originator 
to remove liabilities associated with the transferred assets," arguably is 
"mislead[ing] ... in the sense of causing [the auditor] foreseeably to reach an 
erroneous result.,,18 In my view, however, there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with giving this opinion: in most structured-finance transactions, the 
sale "transfers risk from the [originator to the SPY] and its investors; and 
transfer of risk is, and should be, central to the accounting 
determination .... ,,19 
14. Id 
IS. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 44. For an indication that Professor Coffee may well be arguing 
as I do, see Coffee, supra note 1, at 72 (observing that "a better rule would require the attorney not 
only to halt in the face of red flags, but also to ascertain that the transaction has a 'legitimate 
business purpose "'). 
16. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 3S. See also id at 18 ("The trick ... is identifying what 
constitutes warning signs: some 'red flags' may be (metaphorically) furled and hard to see, whereas 
orange flags sometimes might appear red. "). 
17. See id at S7 (discussing "the reality that actions, including the issuance of legal opinions, 
are often judged ex post with a critical eye"). 
18. Coffee, supra note I, at 68-{59. 
19. Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309, 131S (2002). 
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In summary, Professor Coffee and I appear to be in general agreement 
even though we may quibble in certain limited respects.20 
II. Rejoinder to Professor Macey 
Professor Macey examines why a market for third-party-as opposed to 
simply client-legal opinions exists, and also critiques my "externalities" 
approach to analyzing the nature and limits of legal opinions. I will consider 
his comments in that order. 
Macey first argues that a market for third-party legal opinions-recall 
these are "legal opinions ... provided, at the request of clients, to or for the 
benefit of third parties such as financiers of credit or investors,,21-exists 
because the client's "lawyers can [issue these opinions] more efficiently than 
the lawyers for the third parties.'.22 I agree with much of this argument, and 
indeed find it to be a valuable contribution. I only quibble with Macey's 
comparison between this argument and what he says is my argument: that the 
existence of information asymmetries explains the market for third-party 
legal opinions.23 
I make no such argument, however. My Article does not attempt to 
explain why the market for third-party legal opinions exists. It simply 
observes that "[l]awyers providing the opinion apply applicable law to the 
transaction's particular facts in order to reach their legal conclusions. In this 
sense, third-party legal opinions operate to effectively reduce information 
asymmetry between parties to a transaction.,,24 This is merely a description 
of how the market for third-party legal opinions operates, not an explanation 
of why this market, as opposed to a client-opinion market, arose. 
This quibble aside, Macey's observations help inform my Article. To 
understand how, consider two scenarios: the first, a typical third-party legal 
20. Additional quibbles include the following. Professor Coffee suggests that rating agencies 
are not "demanding consumers of legal opinions." Coffee, supra note I, at 63-64. In my 
experience, though, rating agencies are highly demanding, perhaps because their reputation-by far 
their most important capital-is at stake any time they accept an opinion that turns out to be wrong. 
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. I, 14, 18 (2002). At another point in his response, Professor Coffee bases part 
of his arguments on the fact that "the U.e.e. does not draw any distinction between a 'true sale' and 
a transfer for security where the assets transferred consist of' the types of intangible financial assets 
underlying most structured-finance transactions. Coffee, supra note I, at 69-70. That, however, 
appears to conflate commercial law sales and bankruptcy law sales, as did the court in Octagon Gas 
Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993). See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE 
UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, at § 9-102(l)(b) (1994) (discussing why 
these types of sales should not be conflated). 
21. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 2. 
22. Jonathan Macey, The Limits of Legal Analysis: Using Externalities to Explain Legal 
Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEXAS L. REv. 75, 76 (2005). 
23. [d. at 77. 
24. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
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opinion given by a borrower's law finn to the lender/5 the second, a set of 
true sale and nonconsolidation opinions provided to or for the benefit of an 
SPY's investors by outside counsel to the originator in a structured-finance 
transaction.26 
In the first scenario, the third-party legal opinion traditionally covers a 
range of legal issues, including due authorization, execution, and delivery of 
the loan agreement, no-violation-of-Iaw, no violation of the borrower's con-
tractual obligations, and enforceability of the loan agreement.27 Professor 
Macey's analysis clearly and succinctly explains why the borrower's 
counsel-and not the lender's-give the first three of these opinions. How 
the borrower authorizes loan agreements, and whether loan agreements vio-
late laws or contractual obligations applicable to the borrower, are all issues 
that the borrower's counsel are either already familiar with or must become 
familiar with in order to advise the borrower.28 This is the "economy of 
scope" Macey refers to: combining "the legal work [counsel] do for their 
clients with the legal work that they do for the third parties.,,29 
That explanation does not necessarily explain, though, why the 
borrower's counsel also issues the enforceability opinion. Quite the contrary, 
borrower's counsel are generally much less familiar with the loan agreement 
and its enforceability than lender's counsel because lender's counsel tradi-
tionally draft the loan agreemeneo and are also likely to represent the same 
lender in other loan transactions, thereby becoming familiar with the law 
applicable to the enforceability of loan agreements.31 Furthennore, 
borrower's counsel are always in somewhat of a conflict position when 
giving an enforceability opinion because their client would prefer that the 
loan agreement not be enforceable. Thus, counsel zealously representing the 
borrower would-in a universe lacking professional integrity, reputational 
costs, and liability rules-prefer to opine that a loan agreement is enforceable 
when in fact it is not. 
One possible explanation why borrower's counsel render the 
enforceability opinion derives from Macey's argument: because borrower's 
counsel are already giving the other opinions, it is less costly for them to also 
give the enforceability opinion, as opposed to requiring lender's counsel to 
25. Id. at 9 (using this example to examine the duties oflawyers issuing any type of third-party 
business law opinion). 
26. /d. at 5. This is the scenario on which my Legal Opinions article primarily focuses. 
27. See DONALD W. GLAZER & SCOIT FITZGIBBON, GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL 
OPINIONS xi-xxiii (1992) (providing an overview of the range oflegal opinions). 
28. Macey, supra note 22, at 81. 
29. Id. at 76. 
30. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia M. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, TEXAS L. REv. 1255, 1336 (2002) (observing that "the 
informational advantage that lenders enjoy is compounded by the fact that the lenders design the 
loan terms and draft the underlying loan agreements and disclosures"). 
31. Id. 
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gear up to give that single opinion (notwithstanding that lender's counsel, 
other things being equal, are much better equipped to render this opinion32). 
Two other possible explanations are described in a footnote to my Article: 
"third-party legal opinions can ... decrease risks to the recipient [in this 
example, the lender] by arguably hindering the nonrecipient party's [i.e., the 
borrower's] ability to 'attack[] the validity of the transaction",;33 and "third-
party legal opinions are an accepted (and sometimes almost mandatory) 
means of establishing due diligence on the part of a recipient corporation's 
directors.,,34 As a personal anecdote, as a young lawyer I asked a partner at 
my law firm, Shearman & Sterling, why, as lender's counsel, we always ask 
borrower's counsel to give enforceability opinions on loan agreements that 
we draft and intimately know; the partner responded that the opinion from its 
own counsel might estop the borrower from contesting the loan agreement's 
enforceability-an explanation similar to that referenced above.35 
These explanations also partly help explain why a market for third-party 
legal opinions arose in the second scenario-true sale and nonconsolidation 
opinions provided to or for the benefit of an SPV's investors by outside 
counsel to the originator in a structured-finance transaction.36 A 
nonconsolidation opinion is highly fact specific to the originator, and 
therefore Professor Macey's explanation clearly illuminates why originator's 
counsel, as opposed to investors' counsel, issue it. 
A true sale opinion, on the other hand, is fact dependent almost entirely 
on the document purporting to create the sale.37 Traditionally, as with loan 
agreements, investors' counsel draft this agreement and, being likely to rep-
resent at least some of the same investors in other structured-finance 
transactions, are probably more familiar with the law applicable to true 
sales.38 That law, indeed, is much more complex and nuanced than the law 
32. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (observing that lender's counsel traditionally 
draft the loan agreement and are also likely to represent the lender in ongoing loan transactions for a 
variety of borrowers, thereby becoming familiar with the law applicable to the enforceability of loan 
agreements). 
33. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at II n.55 (cautioning, though, that it is unlikely that a third-party 
legal opinion would dissuade the borrower from asserting defenses or prevent a court from reaching 
its own legal conclusions). 
34. Id. 
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing whether the opinion might hinder the 
borrower's ability to attack the validity of the transaction). 
36. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
37. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION §§ 4:2-4:5 (3d. ed. & supps. 2005) (identifying the important factors relevant to 
true sale determination, all of which are fact dependent solely on the sale documentation). 
Although true sale determination might be marginally influenced by certain factors pertaining to the 
originator, such as intent, even that is "evidenced by the documentation" as well as actions. Id. 
§ 4:6, at 4-11. To the minimal extent actions may be relevant, investors' counsel could request, as 
part of the due diligence for their opinion, a fact certificate from the originator. 
38. This observation is based mainly on my experience. Cf Engel & McCoy, A Tale o/Three 
Markets, supra note 30 (observing that lenders draft the loan documentation). 
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regarding the enforceability of loan agreements, making it even more 
efficient for investors' counsel to give the true sale opinion. Also, 
originator's counsel-like borrower's counsel giving an enforceability 
opinion-are always in somewhat of a conflict position when giving a true 
sale opinion because the originator may well prefer that the transferred finan-
cial assets not actually be sold.39 The "economy of scope" argument 
therefore may not completely explain the existence of a market for third-
party true sale opinions. 
I next tum to Professor Macey's critique of my "externalities" approach 
to analyzing the nature and limits of legal opinions. Here, after cutting 
through a great deal of semantic underbrush, we appear to be very much in 
agreement. The underbrush, however, is thick. 
Macey contends, for example, that my Article does not distinguish 
between externalities that infringe on third-party rights and those that impose 
costs on third parties. True enough, but that distinction would not appear to 
advance my analysis, and indeed Macey does not indicate that it would. 
Macey also suggests my distinction between '-'lawful externalities" and 
"unlawful externalities" is circular; but he bases his reasoning not on my 
definition of these terms but on his own, thus inadvertently creating the 
circularity.4o Macey also questions whether my Article focuses on 
"externalities created by a lawyer's third-party legal opinion" or, instead, on 
"externalities associated with the underlying transactions themselves.'.4\ 
These, in fact, are the same externalities because the legal opinion itself does 
not directly create the externalities but, rather, helps facilitate the transaction 
that creates the externality. 
Macey additionally questions my argument that "if lawyers were 
constrained from providing opinions to effectuate bargained-for lawful 
business transactions that nonetheless may cause externalities, they would be 
forced to substitute their judgment about externalities for that of their 
clients," which would be bad because "clients generally have more and better 
39. See, e.g., SCHWARCZ, supra note 37, § 4:1, at 4-4 (discussing LTV Steel Company's 
challenge to its prebankruptcy structured-finance facilities, arguing that the transfers to the SPV s 
were not true sales and, therefore, that LTV should be able to use the collections of receivables as 
"cash collateral" by giving adequate protection under bankruptcy law). 
40. Professor Macey disregards my defmition of "lawful externalities" (externalities "whose 
causation is neither illegal nor government-constrained as unethical") and substitutes his own 
definition ("a lawful externality is an externality that has been made permissible by the 
government"). Macey, supra note 22, at 79. Under my definition, it is an open question whether 
government should constrain the externality. Under his definition, the government has determined 
that the externality should not be constrained. His definition alone leads to the circularity he 
criticizes: "if a lawful externality is an externality that has been made permissible by the 
government, then the existence of [this] externality cannot be used to justify government 
intervention." Id (emphasis added). 
41. Id at 80. 
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information about the consequences of a transaction, other than the 
transaction's legality.'.42 
This is "not quite a complete argument," he asserts, because "clients are 
likely to have very perverse incentives since it is the clients who receive all 
of the benefits from any negative externalities they impose on others.',43 I 
agree with Professor Macey's observation about perverse incentives. His 
criticism is misplaced, however, because it does not actually address my full 
argument. I further argue that "where lawyers facilitate lawful transactions 
that create problematic externalities, the focus should be not on lawyer con-
duct but instead on whether to legally prohibit those transactions-or at least 
subject the companies that engage in them to liability in order to shift the 
externalities back onto those companies. ,,44 In other words, the government, 
not individual lawyers issuing legal opinions, should be responsible for 
deciding whether to constrain any harmful transactions caused by these 
perverse incentives.45 
Although Macey later appears to recognize my full argument,46 he 
suggests it would lead to an undesirable consequence: 
[I]f this is the case, then neither lawyers writing third-party legal 
opinions nor the companies engaged in the transactions that require 
the generation of such opinions should be expected to engage in any 
review of the externalities associated with any transaction in which 
they are engaged, as distinct from their review of the basic legality of 
the transaction.47 
His view, however, is a non sequitur. My Article does not purport to 
address the extent to which companies engaged in transactions that require 
the generation of such opinions should be expected to review externalities 
associated with such transactions. More germanely, my Article clearly states 
that opining lawyers should review these externalities to assess potential 
violations of norms and warning signs.48 
In short, once one cuts through the tangle of semantics, Professor 
Macey and I appear to be very much in agreement. He almost admits as 
much, observing that "[t]his is not to say that I necessarily disagree with 
Professor Schwarcz's policy conclusions. In fact, I think his observations 
may well be sound.',49 
42. [d. (quoting Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 38). 
43. [d. 
44. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 32-33. 
45. And, similarly, that government, not opining lawyers, should be responsible for deciding 
whether to constrain these incentives. 
46. Macey, supra note 22, at 81. 
47. [d. 
48. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 34-36. 
49. Macey, supra note 22, at 80. 
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III. Rejoinder to Professor Simon 
Professor Simon argues that lawyers should not issue legal opinions to 
assist clients in earnings-management transactions, which he defines as 
transactions "solely [or dominantly] for the purpose of achieving accounting 
effects" that make the company's managers look good.50 He views these 
transactions as presumptively wrongful because, "even where they do not 
involve lying or GAAP violations, 'earnings management' activities are at 
best wasteful and at worst misleading.,,51 Thus, the duty not to issue legal 
opinions to assist these transactions is "most compatible with the idea of 
lawyering as a dignified calling.,,52 
Professor Simon contrasts his view with mine, which, he asserts, takes a 
more limited stance on when law should impose constraints. In reality, 
though, Simon and I are not very far apart in our views. 
On one level, indeed, we are of the same mind. Simon states that 
"[a]nother way to frame" his view that lawyers should not issue legal 
opinions to assist clients in earnings-management transactions "would be to 
insist that management articulate a prima facie plausible business purpose for 
an activity with which he asks the lawyer's assistance.,,53 My Article, 
however, proposes this very duty, arguing that counsel should ascertain that 
structured-finance transactions on which they opine have a valid business 
purpose.54 
Even aside from this simplified "framing," Professor Simon and I have 
largely congruent views. We clearly agree that lawyers should not render 
opinions to assist earnings-management transactions that are illegal, as a 
matter of positive law. We also agree, though for different reasons, that 
lawyers should not render opinions55 to assist earnings-management 
transactions that violate norms, even if those norms have not yet been 
incorporated into positive law.56 
Professor Simon's rationale for why lawyers should not issue opinions 
to assist norms-violating earnings-management transactions is ethically 
principled: lawyers should not participate in conduct that is "socially 
harmful.,,57 Although this is a fine aspirational goal, I hesitate to suggest that 
individual lawyers, at the risk of liability, should have to decide whether 
business transactions are socially harmful where society itself has not made 
50. William H. Simon, Earnings Management as a Professional Responsibility Problem, 84 
TEXAS L. REv. 83, 83 (2005). 
51. Id 
52. Id at 92. 
53. Id at 83. 
54. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 32-37. See also supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text 
(explaining how this duty arises). 
55. Simon, supra note 50, at 87-88. 
56. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 37. 
57. Simon, supra note 50, at 88. 
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that explicit determination. 58 Nonetheless, I conclude that lawyers should 
avoid opining on norms-violating earnings-management transactions for 
pragmatic reasons: issuing opinions to assist these types of transactions can 
hurt the opining counsel's reputation; and when the public suffers losses, it 
tempts judges to find some basis to hold such counsel liable for the harm. 59 
Professor Simon and I disagree more conceptually, however, on 
whether lawyers should be able to render opinions to assist earnings-
management transactions that are neither illegal as a matter of positive law 
nor violative of norms. He takes the same "principled" position described 
above: lawyers should not participate in conduct that is socially harmful.60 In 
contrast, I do not believe these types of transactions are necessarily socially 
harmful, as discussed below.61 Furthermore, even more so than in the 
preceding paragraph, I believe that individual lawyers should not be forced to 
decide, at the risk of liability, whether business transactions are socially 
harmful where society has neither explicitly (as positive law) nor implicitly 
(as a norm) made that determination.62 
I recognize, though, that even where a transaction is not illegal or 
violative of norms, opining counsel ought to remain alert to warning signs of 
problems.63 Where they spot warnings signs, such counsel should not issue 
their opinions unless the warnings signs are favorably resolved.64 At least 
since the recent release of an SEC staff report on off-balance-sheet 
transactions criticizing the use of structured transactions whose sole (or 
perhaps even primary) purpose is motivated by accounting treatment,65 the 
use of structured finance for earnings management may well constitute a 
warning sign. Accordingly, under my Article's framework, counsel asked to 
opine on a structured-finance earnings-management transaction should 
examine the transaction more closely before issuing their opinion. 
58. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 19-21. Cf E-mail from Richard W. Painter, Guy Raymond and 
Mildred VanVoorhis Jones, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, and newly appointed 
White House Chief Ethics Officer, to author (Feb. 13, 2005) (on file with author) (observing that 
although the concept that a legal opinion should fairly present the situation is "sound in principal," 
it is "notoriously vague if used to impose liability on lawyers" and therefore might serve as a 
"definition of professionalism, but not as grounds for civil liability"). 
59. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 37. 
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
61. See, e.g., infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (explaining why structured-finance 
transactions used for earnings management need not necessarily be harmful). 
62. A lawyer who believes a transaction is personally objectionable always can resign, of 
course, or not represent the client in the first place. 
63. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 236. 
64. See id. at 34. 
65. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL 
PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 45, available at http://www.sec. 
gov/news/studies/soxoffbalanceerpt.pdf. See also Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing this 
SEC staff report). 
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To understand how such an examination might proceed, consider a 
simple example. Counsel are asked to opine on the enforceability of an 
agreement for the sale of a client's warehouse but learn that the client's sole 
purpose for selling the warehouse is to use the sale proceeds to pay down 
debt and reduce balance-sheet leverage. Although this constitutes earnings 
management, few would argue this transaction is wrongful. Sales of tangible 
property are commonplace, and relatively few burdens associated with such 
sales are typically retained by sellers. 
Now vary the facts slightly. Assume, first, that counsel are asked to 
opine on the enforceability of an agreement for the sale of a client's financial 
assets to an SPY, which in tum sells securities to investors to finance the 
assets' purchase. So far, this is a classic structured-finance transaction, by 
itself not wrongful. Next assume that opining counsel learn that the client's 
sole purpose for engaging in this transaction is, as in the "simple example" 
above, to use the sale proceeds to pay down debt and reduce balance-sheet 
leverage. Being earnings management, this revelation raises a warning sign. 
Under my Article's framework, counsel should not issue their opinion 
without favorably resolving this warning sign. Professor Simon likewise 
would argue that counsel should not issue their opinion without rebutting his 
presumption that this transaction-a structured-finance transaction used for 
earnings management-is wrongful.66 To the extent the finding needed to 
rebut Simon's presumption is similar to that needed for favorably resolving 
the warning sign, he and I are effectively saying the same thing. 
Professor Simon does not describe precisely how opining counsel 
should rebut a presumption of wrongfulness. I would expect, however, that a 
finding that the earnings management is not misleading, and thus not 
harmful, would be sufficient. That finding certainly should be sufficient, in 
my judgment, to favorably resolve a warning sign. 
In the transaction described above, for example, opining counsel may 
engage in this finding by examining whether the benefits and burdens 
associated with the transferred financial assets have been shifted to the Spy 
and its investors in a manner consistent with a sale of such assets.67 Counsel 
also presumably should take into account whether any burdens not so 
shifted-especially to the extent they constitute contingent liabilities-have 
been adequately disclosed to the client's investors. To the extent opining 
counsel find that these benefits and burdens have been shifted in a manner 
consistent with a sale of financial assets and that any burdens not shifted 
66. Simon, supra note 50, at 88-91. 
67. Indeed, this is much the same analysis that counsel must make in order to opine that the 
transfer constitutes a true sale for bankruptcy purposes. SCHWARCZ, supra note 37, §§ 4:1-4:3. 
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have been adequately disclosed, that finding ought to be sufficient to resolve 
concerns under both Simon's framework and mine.68 
IV. Conclusions 
Professors Coffee, Macey, Simon, and I appear to be in fundamental 
accord that lawyers should ascertain that structured-finance transactions-
and, by extension, any other business transactions-on which they opine 
have a valid business purpose. We also appear to be in accord that opining 
counsel should remain alert to other possible warning signs of problems, and 
that where warning signs are spotted opining counsel should investigate 
further before issuing their opinions. 
Professors Coffee, Simon, and I disagree, however, about the extent to 
which lawyers should be permitted to issue opinions that facilitate the subset 
of transactions that are structured for the sole or primary purpose of earnings 
management. Coffee suggests, for example, that a true sale opinion may be 
misleading to the extent an accountant relies on it to permit the originator to 
remove liabilities associated with transferred assets from its balance sheet. 
Simon contends that the issuance of legal opinions to facilitate earnings-
management transactions may be incompatible with "the idea of lawyering as 
a dignified calling,,69 because such transactions are "at best wasteful and at 
worst misleading.,,70 
These are noble aspirations; and indeed, where the earnings-
management transaction in question would be illegal under positive law or 
violative of norms, my Article specifically argues that counsel should not 
facilitate the transaction by issuing legal opinions. Coffee, Simon, and I may 
differ, though, in the scenario where the earnings-management (or, by 
extension, any other business) transaction would be legal under positive law 
and not violative of norms. Here, I cannot agree that lawyers should be 
hamstrung by being forced to decide, at the risk of liability, whether they 
must disregard their clients' requests for legal opinions. The focus in these 
cases, I argue, should be on whether government itself should restrict the 
underlying harm.7l 
68. This is a nonnative analysis. I make no claim whether, in fact, it will satisfy the SEC staff. 
Cf supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing recent SEC staff report on off-balance-sheet 
transactions). Nonnative1y, though, it should satisfy the SEC staff. 
69. Simon, supra note 50, at 83. 
70. Id. at 92. 
71. As indeed, I argue, government is beginning to do in the earnings-management context. See 
supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the possible impact of the June 15, 2005 SEC 
staff report on off-balance-sheet transactions). 
